For students of usul , this page is a milestone. For the average believer, it is reassurance that our scholarly tradition has always valued wisdom, custom, and ease alongside textual fidelity.

So the next time you hear someone dismiss Hanafi fiqh as “too rigid” or, conversely, “too loose,” send them to page 89. There, in the careful lines of a medieval commentator, lies the balanced soul of a school that has served half the Muslim world for over a millennium. Have you studied a specific edition of Sharh al-Hanafiyah? Which commentary does your page 89 belong to? Share your insights in the comments below.

Today, we dive deep into the arguments, examples, and methodological rigour that make this page a cornerstone of Hanafi legal epistemology. Before we turn to page 89, let us set the stage. Sharh al-Hanafiyah is not a single book but a genre—commentaries written to explain the foundational texts of the Hanafi school. The most celebrated of these include Sharh al-Tahawi on creed and Sharh al-Hidayah on positive law. Page 89 typically falls within the discussion of al-adillah al-mukhtalaf fiha (disputed evidences), specifically the permissibility of departing from a strict analogy when it leads to hardship. The Opening of Page 89: Qiyas Jali vs. Qiyas Khafi The page likely opens with a bold statement from the commentator: "Wa i‘lam anna al-qiyas laysa kullan sawa’ – Know that not all analogies are equal." Here, the author distinguishes between manifest analogy ( qiyas jali ), where the effective cause ( illah ) is obvious and textually indicated, and hidden analogy ( qiyas khafi ), where the illah is extracted through subtle reasoning. The Hanafi position, as articulated on page 89, is that istihsan is permitted only when a hidden analogy produces a ruling that conflicts with public welfare ( maslahah ) or established custom ( ‘urf ).

In the vast ocean of Hanafi legal theory ( usul al-fiqh ), certain pages stand as intellectual landmarks. Page 89 of Sharh al-Hanafiyah —depending on the manuscript (be it a gloss on Al-Usul by Al-Jassas or a supercommentary on Al-Hidayah )—is widely recognised among students of jurisprudence as a turning point in the discussion on analogical reasoning ( qiyas ) and its nuanced counterpart, juristic preference ( istihsan ).

Sharh Hanafiyah Page 89 Updated May 2026

For students of usul , this page is a milestone. For the average believer, it is reassurance that our scholarly tradition has always valued wisdom, custom, and ease alongside textual fidelity.

So the next time you hear someone dismiss Hanafi fiqh as “too rigid” or, conversely, “too loose,” send them to page 89. There, in the careful lines of a medieval commentator, lies the balanced soul of a school that has served half the Muslim world for over a millennium. Have you studied a specific edition of Sharh al-Hanafiyah? Which commentary does your page 89 belong to? Share your insights in the comments below. sharh hanafiyah page 89

Today, we dive deep into the arguments, examples, and methodological rigour that make this page a cornerstone of Hanafi legal epistemology. Before we turn to page 89, let us set the stage. Sharh al-Hanafiyah is not a single book but a genre—commentaries written to explain the foundational texts of the Hanafi school. The most celebrated of these include Sharh al-Tahawi on creed and Sharh al-Hidayah on positive law. Page 89 typically falls within the discussion of al-adillah al-mukhtalaf fiha (disputed evidences), specifically the permissibility of departing from a strict analogy when it leads to hardship. The Opening of Page 89: Qiyas Jali vs. Qiyas Khafi The page likely opens with a bold statement from the commentator: "Wa i‘lam anna al-qiyas laysa kullan sawa’ – Know that not all analogies are equal." Here, the author distinguishes between manifest analogy ( qiyas jali ), where the effective cause ( illah ) is obvious and textually indicated, and hidden analogy ( qiyas khafi ), where the illah is extracted through subtle reasoning. The Hanafi position, as articulated on page 89, is that istihsan is permitted only when a hidden analogy produces a ruling that conflicts with public welfare ( maslahah ) or established custom ( ‘urf ). For students of usul , this page is a milestone

In the vast ocean of Hanafi legal theory ( usul al-fiqh ), certain pages stand as intellectual landmarks. Page 89 of Sharh al-Hanafiyah —depending on the manuscript (be it a gloss on Al-Usul by Al-Jassas or a supercommentary on Al-Hidayah )—is widely recognised among students of jurisprudence as a turning point in the discussion on analogical reasoning ( qiyas ) and its nuanced counterpart, juristic preference ( istihsan ). There, in the careful lines of a medieval