Here is your 3-step migration plan:

The problem is the fallback . If the DC can't find the strong binding (perhaps due to an old certificate or a misconfigured attribute), it happily accepts the weak mapping. Attackers specifically craft their exploits to trigger that fallback path, bypassing strong binding entirely.

Ensure you are on Level 1. Then, enable Audit Mode for Certificate Mapping via Group Policy: Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Advanced Audit Policies > Account Logon > Audit Kerberos Authentication Service

In security, "fallback to insecure" is just "insecure with extra steps." Before you flip the switch to Level 2 across all your DCs, you need to audit your environment. Switching to Enforced will break authentication for any user or device that relies on weak certificate mapping.

If the crypto doesn’t match the claimed identity, authentication fails. Microsoft introduced the StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry key (located under HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc ) to control this behavior. It accepts three values:

If you manage a hybrid or on-premises Active Directory environment, you’ve likely seen the registry key StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement while auditing Group Policy settings or scanning through Microsoft security baselines.

| Value | Mode | Behavior | | :--- | :--- | :--- | | | Disabled | The DC uses legacy weak mappings (AltSecID) only. Highly insecure. | | 1 | Compat (Legacy) | The DC tries strong binding first. If that fails, it falls back to weak mappings. This is the default for older domain functional levels. | | 2 | Enforced | The DC requires strong binding. Weak mappings are ignored. This is the modern security standard. | Why "Compat" Mode (1) is Dangerous Most environments currently sit at Level 1 (Compat) . At first glance, this seems safe—it tries to be secure.